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The most serious candidates for common causes that fail to screen off (‘interactive
common causes’, ICCs) and thus violate the causal Markov condition (CMC) refer
to quantum phenomena. In her seminal debate with Hausman and Woodward,
Cartwright early on focussed on unfortunate non-quantum examples. Especially,
Hausman and Woodward’s redescriptions of quantum cases saving the CMC remain
unchallenged. This paper takes up this lose end of the discussion and aims to
resolve the debate in favour of Cartwright’s position. It systematically considers
redescriptions of ICC structures, including those by Hausman and Woodward, and
explains why these are inappropriate, when quantum mechanics (in an objective
collapse interpretation) is true. It first shows that all cases of purported quantum
ICCs are cases of entanglement and then, using the tools of causal modelling, it
provides an analysis of the quantum mechanical formalism for the case that the
collapse of entangled systems is best described as a causal model with an ICC.
1 Introduction
The common wisdom is that common causes screen off their effects: If two variables a and
b have a common cause c and are not directly causally related (neither is a a cause of b
nor vice versa), then a and b are marginally correlated but statistically independent given
knowledge about c. This statistical characterization is widely believed to be a central
feature of common causes and is captured by the causal Markov condition (CMC),1 which
1 The CMC is a generalization of Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause (Reichenbach 1956;
Hitchcock and Rédei 2020, §7).
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is part of our best theories of causation (the CMC is an axiom of the theory of causal
Bayes nets by Spirtes et al. 1993 and Pearl 2000, and a purported consequence of the
interventionist theory of Woodward 2003).
Some philosophers have challenged this view by a number of counterexamples: They
have adduced situations in which conditional on the common cause the correlation persists
and in this sense the common cause fails to screen off its effects from another. Referring
to Salmon’s interactive forks (1978; 1984), which were the first putative counterexamples,
we shall call such common causes that do not screen off ‘interactive common causes’ (ICC)
and qualify usual common causes, that do screen off, as ‘conjunctive common causes’.
Today it is well-known that many cases of purported ICCs, among them Salmon’s original
proposals, are artefacts of incorrect descriptions of the system in question (cf. Spirtes
et al. 2000, 35f): described properly, all common causes in such systems do screen off
and the CMC holds. We call such cases ‘apparent ICCs’ as opposed to ‘genuine ICCs’
that persist even in a correct description. While apparent ICCs are an epistemological
challenge and occur frequently in scientific practice, it is of course genuine ICCs, violating
the CMC, which are conceptually most interesting.
It is controversial whether all reported cases of ICCs are apparent,
(Q1) Are there genuine ICCs in our world?
and it is this question that I shall treat in the present paper. I shall answer (Q1) in the
affirmative by arguing that not all cases of purported ICCs can plausibly be redescribed
such that the CMC holds: There are systems in our world that involve a causal anomaly
that genuinely has the structure of an ICC. Such genuine ICCs are not the result of a
misdescription, but are real structures in our world.
Since the debate about possible violations of the CMC by common causes is ramified,
I emphasize that (Q1) is to be distinguished from the following related but logically
independent questions (Q2)–(Q6), which I do not treat in this paper:
(Q2) Do all causal systems fulfil the CMC?2
(Q3) If there is a failure of the CMC by genuine ICCs, how can one explain the
correlation between the effects of the ICC (which are stronger than a usual
common causes would explain)?
(Q4) Do all causal systems fulfil modularity, i.e. the condition, roughly, that every
effect in a system comes about by its own separate mechanism?
(Q5) If there is a failure of modularity by genuine ICCs, how can one explain the
failure of modularity?
2 Note that it is possible to answer both (Q1) and (Q2) in the affirmative, which is to say that there are
systems with ICCs, but that such systems are not causal (cf. van Fraassen 1982a). So speaking of
‘ICCs’ is not to be understood in itself as a judgement about a system being causal, but rather as a
name for a certain model that consists of the directed graph for a common cause and a probability
distribution, according to which the common cause does not screen off its effects. Then, claiming that
there are ICCs, i.e. there are systems that are appropriately described by such graphical-probabilistic
models, is consistent with the view that such models are acausal (because, e.g., the model does not
conform to the CMC).
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(Q6) Does modularity imply the CMC?
In this paper I focus on discussing the evidence for the case that there are genuine ICC
structures (Q1) without treating (Q2)–(Q6).
As ICCs violate usual principles of causal modelling – by definition the CMC and, as
a matter of fact, as I shall explain, also modularity and independent fixability – I further
emphasize that in this paper I neither treat the question what the existence of ICC
structures implies for the status of these principles of causal modelling. There are two
rough options: either systems with genuine ICCs are not causal and hence the principles
of causal modelling are not affected since they should not be applied to such systems. Or
such systems are causal, and the principles of causal modelling are violated and need
to be revised (at least for those domains in which ICCs occur). The reader may have a
preference for the one or the other position but I shall not attempt to decide between
them in this paper.
My main claim that there are genuine ICCs is not new. After the very first examples
by Salmon and others had turned out to be apparent ICCs, it were van Fraassen
(1980, 1982a,b) and especially Cartwright (1988, 1989) who provided the most promising
candidates for genuine ICCs violating the CMC. The common characteristic of the
examples is that common causes act indeterministically and produce their effects in pairs
(e.g. due to conservation laws). Since indeterminism is required, realistic examples refer
to the quantum domain (in an indeterministic collapse interpretation): A prominent
example is the indeterministic decay of a molecule into two halves, where the momenta
(or the size) of the halves is perfectly anti-correlated, but the state prior to decay does
not screen off this strong correlation; another is the measurement of entangled properties
in EPR experiments.
The position that there are genuine ICCs has not been very popular in the causal
modelling literature, and has been defended for the last three decades or so nearly
exclusively by Nancy Cartwright (though probably with some silent sympathizers; among
the few recent advocates is Näger 2014, 2016). While her early writings on the subject
were based on clear quantum cases of ICCs, Cartwright later mainly focussed on the
example of a chemical factory (first in Cartwright 1993, and repeated in many following
publications), which let her defence of ICCs turn out not as strong as it could have
been, for at least two reasons. First, unlike the factory example, the quantum cases
are particularly strong because they rest on a precise mathematical description that is
empirically well-confirmed. Second, combining the claim with other controversial theses
has watered down the position. In particular, the case of the chemical factory—assumes
controversial macro indeterminism, which has been shrugged off as fictitious (Glymour
1999; Hausman and Woodward 2004a). Finally, Cartwright’s defence suffered from the
fact that she shifted focus from the central question (Q1) to related questions such as
(Q2).
The debate between Cartwright on the one, arguing for genuine ICCs, and Hausman
and Woodward on the other side, defending the CMC against Cartwright’s criticism,
is the deepest and most intense debate about ICCs up to date, treating or at least
touching upon all of questions (Q1)–(Q6); it took place in a series of long and intricate
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papers (Hausman and Woodward 1999; Cartwright 2002; Hausman and Woodward
2004a,b; Cartwright 2006) and illustrates the shift in discussion. In their first response to
Cartwright, Hausman and Woodward (1999) extensively discuss the example of entangled
quantum states and propose that even the quantum examples only apparently violate the
CMC because the causal structure is misrepresented. In her subsequent answers, however,
Cartwright does not reply to these questionable proposals (without giving reasons), and
the debate focusses on her factory example, that Hausman and Woodward easily dismiss,
and then continues to treat questions (Q2)–(Q6).
In this way it happened that up to now Hausman and Woodward’s proposals that
would save the CMC in the quantum realm are undisputed; a debate about the plausibility
of their claims is still missing. In general, the debate about proposed quantum ICCs has
never been led conclusively and, since quantum ICCs are the most serious candidates for
genuine ICCs, there exists considerable unclarity whether there are such ICCs.
This paper investigates in detail the central evidence for and against assuming a genuine
ICC model for the quantum cases. Against arguments by Hausman and Woodward (and
others) I defend the view that, if quantum theory in a dynamical collapse interpretation
is true, there are genuine ICCs. In this sense this paper aims to catch up what Cartwright
could have said in response to Hausman and Woodward 20 years ago and to make her
case for ICCs as strong as it can be made. My main argument will be an analysis of the
quantum mechanical formalism that yields an appropriate causal model for the theory.
In this way, the present work is also a contribution to the emerging field of quantum
causal modelling.
Since there are different interpretations of the quantum realm I should mention at the
outset that this paper presupposes an interpretation of quantum theory that conforms to
the following assumptions:
(i) Strong quantum state realism: Quantum states completely describe objective and
fundamental features of physical systems.
(ii) Indeterministic collapse dynamics: There are processes, in particular measurements
with macroscopic devices, that are correctly described as a collapse of the quantum
state, and the collapse is indeterministic in an ontic sense.
These assumptions are met by so called objective (or: dynamical) collapse theories. In
most of the paper I shall assume the most simple version of such a theory, namely the
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory (GRW; Ghirardi et al. 1986), which assumes that the
collapse is discrete and instantaneous. Only at the end of the paper (section 5) I shall
generalize the results to continuous collapse theories (e.g. the CSL theory; Pearle 1989;
Ghirardi et al. 1990). The question whether there are ICCs is controversial even given
the assumption of a dynamical collapse theory.
The paper is organised in five main sections. After a short characterization of ICCs
that also introduces some terminology (section 2), I review diverse phenomena from
the quantum realm that purportedly are serious candidates for genuine ICCs and argue
that all such examples are cases of entanglement (section 3). The question whether
there are genuine ICCs then reduces to the question whether entangled systems involve
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genuine ICCs. Analyzing the quantum mechanical formalism, I argue that entangled
systems involve genuine ICCs; I also examine in detail why the main rival proposals are
not viable (section 4). Finally, I generalize my result from discrete collapse theories to
continuous ones (section 5) and shortly discuss the existence of ICCs according to other
interpretations of quantum theory (section 6).
2 Characterizing ICCs
2.1 Cartwright’s paradigmatic case and the decaying molecule
Cartwright proposes one of the paradigmatic examples in the debate: A ‘particle collides
with an atom and the atom emits two new particles as a consequence’ (Cartwright 1988,
184). Here we consider a variant of her example3 that there is a molecule in an unstable
state z1, which is disposed to decay and at some point decays into two even smaller
objects, say, two atoms of the same kind. Due to the conservation of momentum, it is
determined that the atoms move in opposite direction, such that their total momentum
remains zero. What is undetermined about this process is along which direction the
atoms fly off. Cartwright assumes the most simple case that there are only two possible
directions (0 or 1), i.e. either, with a certain probability q, we have the momenta x0 and
y0 (with x0 = −y0), or, with probability 1− q, we have the momenta x1 and y1 (with
x1 = −y1; see Figure 1). By these assumptions, the probability distribution of this case is
P (x0y0|z1) = q P (x0y1|z1) = 0 P (x1y0|z1) = 0 P (x1y1|z1) = 1− q, (1)
which implies the conditional probabilities for each single atom,
P (x0|z1) = q P (y0|z1) = q P (x1|z1) = 1− q P (y1|z1) = 1− q. (2)
Here we have described physical properties or states, respectively, by values of variables
x0/1, y0/1 and z1. We shall denote the corresponding variables by bold symbols x, y,
z and describe causal structures, as is usual in causal modelling, as between variables.
Assuming, as it seems natural in the present case, that the state z of the molecule prior
to decay both causes the momentum x as well as the momentum y of the emerging
smaller molecules, and that these momenta do not influence each other after decay, yields
a common cause structure x← z → y. Since causal models consist of a causal structure
(typically, a directed acyclic graph involving a set of variables as nodes and directed edges
between the nodes such that there are no loops of arrows) and a probability distribution
over the variables, this completes the causal model of the decaying molecule.
In causal modelling one usually requires certain axioms that constrain which probability
distributions are consistent with which structures. The central assumption is the
3 The reason to deviate here is that, in Cartwright’s example, momentum conservation, which is required
for the example, need not strictly be conserved for the pair of emitted particles, because the atom
can resorb some momentum as well.
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Figure 1: A molecule in state z1 decays indeterministically into two oppositely moving
parts along one of two directions
Causal Markov condition (CMC):4 A variable a in a given causal structure
is probabilistically independent of its non-effects (NE) conditional on its direct
causes (DC): [
B = NE(a) ∧ C = DC(a)
]
→ I(a,B|C).
The CMC is typically required to hold for all variables in a causal structure represented
by a directed acyclic graph. For a common cause structure x ← z → y the condition
requires the statistical independence
I(x,y|z)↔ ∀x, y, z : P (xy|z) = P (x|z)P (y|z), (3)
which is also denoted as ‘z screening off x from y’.
A simple comparison between (1) and (2), however, yields that according to the causal
model describing Cartwright’s example, the value z1 of the common cause, the considered
state of the molecule before decay, in general does not screen off the perfect correlation
between the atoms’ momenta x0 and y0:
P (x0y0|z1) = q 6= q2 = P (x0|z1)P (y0|z1). (4)
The common cause model of Cartwright’s decaying molecule thus clearly violates the
CMC.
Let me make two comments. First, the result that z1 does not screen off does not
depend on the exact value of q, as long as q is not 0 or 1. When q is 0 or 1 (‘determinism’),
however, the equations reveal that screening-off holds trivially. Hence, indeterminism is
a necessary ingredient for genuine ICCs.
It is an open question whether proposed ICCs such as the decaying molecule, besides
4cf. Spirtes et al. 1993, sec. 3.4.1; Pearl 2000, p. 19
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violating the CMC, violate the condition of modularity. The condition, which has been
introduced by Hausman and Woodward (1999), expresses the idea that every effect in a
causal model comes about by its own separate process or mechanism. In mathematical
causal models this is reflected in the fact that every variable has its own separate equation
that determines its value by the values of its causes. If modularity holds, every causal
process of the model is, in principle, independently disruptable, i.e. can be stopped without
interfering with any other causal process that is not an effect of the stopped process.
Hausman and Woodward (1999, 2004b) claim that modularity (plus some additional
conditions) imply the CMC. If this were true, an ICC violating the CMC would also
violate modularity (or one of the additional assumptions); however, Cartwright (2002,
2006) and Steel (2006) criticise the implication and it seems an open question whether the
proposed cases of ICCs in fact violate modularity. We shall come back to this question
in Section 4.3.3.
2.2 Conjunctive vs. interactive common causes
Here we shall not attempt at a general definition of ICCs in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions, which would be against the spirit of an axiomatic characterization
of causal structures that causal modelling by causal Bayes nets provides (cf. Glymour
2004). Rather, we discern and characterize conjunctive and interactive common causes
via general paradigmatic causal models, of which the model for the decaying molecule is
an instance.
The most simple, paradigmatic causal models with these types of common causes are
shown in figure 2a and 2b. The models are to be understood as sufficient conditions:
If there is a causal structure as indicated and the statistics is as indicated, then z is a
conjunctive or interactive common cause, respectively. ICCs are marked by drawing an
arc between the outgoing arrows, indicating that screening-off by the common cause fails.
These paradigmatic cases involving three variables might also be found as substructures
of causal models. Note further that by these paradigmatic cases we have not said what it
means to be an ICC in more complex cases (especially when x and y are additionally
connected by a directed causal path or if there are further common causes of x and y)
— this would require an axiomatic characterization. Since here we are about to argue
that there are ICCs at all, it suffices to show that there are ICCs of the paradigmatic
kind; so in the rest of the paper we shall concentrate on the simple paradigmatic causal
structures.
An ICC z in a causal model M is apparent when according to the system S (a system
in the world, a model of a theory or a causal model itself) that M describes, z is in fact
a conjunctive common cause, i.e. M misrepresents the ontology of S with regard to z’s
interactiveness. An ICC is genuine when it is not apparent.
It is well-known that one can generate models with ICCs by misrepresenting the
causal structure in question. Figure 3 provides an overview of the central cases. It shows
structures with the three variables z, x and y that yield z as an apparent ICC of x and
y (a), if one wrongly omits those elements of the structures that are depicted in grey
(b–h). We shall comment on each of these possible misrepresentations when discussing
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(b) Interactive common cause
Figure 2: Two kinds of common cause models
the causal structure of the quantum mechanical formalism in section 4.
3 Promising candidates for genuine ICCs
3.1 Quantum ICCs are the most serious candidates for genuine ICCs
There is a number of purported cases that have exactly the same formal structure as the
paradigmatic example (or can at least be simplified to have that structure). One needs
to distinguish fictitious examples from realistic ones: The former are simply cooked up
by assuming a suitable formal structure, however, without providing (enough) evidence
that in fact there are such systems in our world (e.g. van Fraassen’s dividing bullet and
Cartwright’s chemical factory have been claimed to be of this kind). Realistic examples,
in contrast, agree in their structure with our best scientific theories or models, and it is
controversial whether there are such examples.
Since indeterminism is a necessary ingredient for ICCs, the scientific background theory
required for the realistic cases must be indeterministic. While many special sciences involve
theories or models with indeterministic dynamics, such cases can easily be dismissed as
involving only epistemic indeterminism, i.e. a more detailed description, which might
epistemically not be accessible, would reveal that determinism and consequently screening-
off holds.5 The matter is difficult to assess,6 but in the absence of strong arguments
for ontic macro indeterminism, the genuineness of most macro cases from the special
sciences remains at best unclear and potentially threatened by the reductionist claim.
In contrast, quantum theory (in a dynamical collapse reading) is ontically indetermin-
istic and since the theory furthermore happens to be the most successful one in scientific
5 The misdescriptions can either involve more fine-grained variables (Figure 3b) or additional common
causes (Figure 3c and d).
6 For instance, Cartwright (1983, ch. 6; 1999, ch. 1) provides arguments for a dappled world with
ontically irreducible macro laws, while Hoefer (2008) makes the case for ontic reductionism.
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(f) Cyclic direct cause structure
Figure 3: Generation of apparent ICCs. Omitting the grey elements in the causal struc-
tures (b)–(j) yields an apparent ICC (a).
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(j) Single effect structure 3: unity by dependent
fixability
Figure 3: Generation of apparent ICCs [continued]
history, quantum ICCs are the most serious examples for genuine ICCs.
3.2 Prima facie classification of proposed quantum ICCs
Prima facie, there seem to be four basic classes of quantum ICCs. (i) Cartwright’s
example of unstable molecules belongs to the category of decay or division. Radioactive
α-decay is another clear case in this category. The ICC candidate is the unstable state of
the radium nucleus that, in a certain amount of time, indeterministically decomposes
into a helium nucleus and a radon nucleus, or not. Either both the radium and the radon
nucleus are present or both are not – which fulfils the typical formal scheme of an ICC.
(ii) Other types of radioactivity like β-decay (a nucleus emits an electron and an
anti-electron neutrino and a neutron inside the nucleus is transformed into a proton), or
γ-decay (where a nucleus emits a high-energy photon and enters a lower energy state),
might rather be subsumed under the class of emission processes: A system emits with
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a certain probability another system and thereby enters a new state itself. Another
example would be atoms (or molecules) in an excited state, which in a certain time span
with probability q emit a photon and (due to energy conservation) transit to their ground
states, or (with probability 1− q) do not emit a photon and just remain in the excited
state.
(iii) Examples for a third class, jointly generated objects, are numerous in high energy
physics, where collisions of two particles produce with a certain probability two (or
more) particles, but due to conservation laws (especially energy and momentum, but
also charge, spin, isospin, etc.) only certain combinations of particles can occur. For
instance, one might have the case that collisions of an electron with its anti-particle
(positron) with probability q produce an up quark and its anti-particle (up anti-quark)
while with probability 1 − q the collision produces a down quark and its anti-particle
(down anti-quark).






as they are prepared in EPR/B experiments (maximally entangled for q = 12 , e.g. the
entangled polarization state of two photons), yield exactly the same probability distribu-
tion as in Cartwright’s example (when measured at parallel settings): At measurement,
the entangled state collapses onto one of the two product states
|x0〉|y0〉 with probability q or
|x1〉|y1〉 with probability 1− q.
(6)
Since it is well-known that it is a peculiarity of entangled quantum states to be delocalized
such that they can produce the correlated polarization measurements at space-like
separation, we should note that our present considerations about ICCs do not hinge
on this quantum non-locality in any way (causal graphs and statistics do not involve
spatio-temporal features).
3.3 All proposed quantum ICCs are due to quantum entanglement
Despite the differences between the four classes of ICCs, there is a common feature
(which at first sight might seem unintuitive): All mentioned processes defining a class
are in fact cases of quantum entanglement. The reason is simple: According to the
quantum mechanical formalism, if there are two alternative scenarios, say, x0 and y0
happening with a certain probability q, and x1 and y1 occurring with probability 1−q (as
in our paradigmatic scheme for an ICC), then the only way of the quantum mechanical
formalism to express this is exactly to ascribe an entangled state as in (5).
Prior to its decay, Cartwright’s molecule is in the state (5), where the momentum
states of the one particle (|x0〉, |x1〉) are entangled with that of the other (|y0〉, |y1〉). Or
consider again the case of an excited atom that emits a photon (an excitation of the
mode of the electromagnetic field) and thereby transits to its ground state: Since atomic
states are always coupled to the electromagnetic field, the excited state is, in fact, an
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entangled state of an atom’s excitation state and the excitation state of a mode of the
electro-magnetic field, which eventually transits to a product state of the two (see Walls
and Milburn 2008). While entanglement is usually only associated with its paradigm
cases in EPR/B experiments, this consideration points to the fact, which is well-known
among physicists, that entanglement is widespread in quantum systems with more than
one object.
Consequently, the prima facie categorisation of quantum ICCs into different classes
(i)–(iv) is somewhat misleading. In fact, all classes of proposed quantum ICCs are
instances of quantum entanglement. Hence, entangled quantum systems are the most
serious candidates for genuine ICCs in our world. This insight allows to narrow down
our quest for genuine ICCs: The question whether there are genuine ICCs reduces to the
question whether entangled systems involve genuine ICCs.
4 Causal analysis of the quantum mechanical formalism
We shall now examine whether measurements at an entangled system are correctly
described by an ICC structure. According to a discrete dynamical collapse interpretation
(GRW), which we presuppose here, the system is described by an entangled state (5), which
shortly after contact with the measurement device collapses (with some probability) into
one of two possible product states (6). Which causal structure appropriately represents
this formal description? I propose that the entangled state z is an ICC of the states
of the disentangled particles x and y after collapse (Figure 3a). While this view is not
new (van Fraassen cf. 1982a; Cartwright cf. 1989; Butterfield cf. 1989)) I here present a
detailed analysis of the quantum mechanical formalism in terms of causal modelling. In
developing my answer I shall contrast the proposed model with rival models claiming
quantum ICCs to be apparent (see Figure 3). I first discuss whether the variables are
appropriately chosen before I treat the connections between them.
4.1 Modelling the entangled state prior to collapse as a single variable
The proposed ICC model describes the entangled quantum state (5) prior to collapse as
a single variable z because entangled states are non-separable.
One might object that despite its non-separability the entangled state in the quantum
mechanical description is composed of states for each of its two components and also
that at measurement the entangled system decays into two systems. It might therefore
have some appeal to assume the entangled system as being composed of two subsystems,
each of whose states should be described by the value of a distinct variable (x′ and y′,
respectively) and at the same time be closely related due to being non-separable. One
might wish to symbolize the intimate relation between the two by an undirected edge,
resulting in the model x′–y′ for the entangled state.
The so modelled entangled state can be integrated in the causal graph in two ways:
one can either conceive of x′ and y′ as distinct variables, though connected by a relation
of non-separability, such that each x′ and y′ can be a cause, i.e. the origin of an arrow
in the graph (Figure 4a). Or one can assume that the non-separable state x′–y′ acts as
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one cause (Figure 4b), in which case, however, one is essentially back to describing the
entangled state as one variable in the causal diagram (modulo an internal structure). So















Figure 4: Proposals for modelling the non-separable entangled state
There are at least three difficulties with the proposal. A minor problem is that one
would have to make clear, how to derive probabilistic consequences from a structure with
the unusual element of an undirected edge (I think that this can be overcome).
Second, since variables in causal modelling must have definite values, each x′ and
y′ would have to have a definite value, i.e. each describes a well-defined state of the
corresponding component system (and the connection between them presumably indicates
that there are restrictions for the possible combinations of values). In quantum theory
the only reasonable candidate for such states are the reduced density matrices of the
component systems; however, pairs of such reduced density matrices are well-known not
to be able to reproduce the strong correlations between the outcomes x and y.
Third, even if one could redescribe the entangled state in a more fine-grained way
by two connected variables, that would not help to save the CMC. Whatever the exact
meaning of the substructure x′–y′ is: Since in the causal graph it has the role of a
common cause, it is a requirement of the CMC that conditional on x′–y′, the correlation
between x and y is screened off. Since, however, x′–y′ represents the entangled state
and the entangled state is known to not screen off the correlation between x and y,
x′–y′ does not screen off. Hence, the CMC will be violated in that description as well.
In sum, it is questionable whether the description of an entangled state by two
connected variables can succeed; and even if it does it does not seem to make a difference
for the violation of CMC. For these reasons I shall describe the entangled state prior to
collapse by a single variable z.
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4.2 There are no further relevant variables prior to collapse
According to the proposed model, the entangled quantum state z is the only variable
prior to collapse. As it is well-known that omitting proper common causes can lead to
apparent ICCs (Figure 3b–d),7 it is a central requirement in causal modelling that one has
accounted for all common causes of the set of considered variables (‘causal sufficiency’).
First, since here we are presupposing that the quantum mechanical formalism is
complete, we can safely rule out that there are states beyond the quantum mechanical
formalism that need to be considered. This precludes structures that presuppose that
the entangled quantum state is an incomplete description requiring a more precise
characterization by hidden variables u (Figure 3b) or that there is a further latent
common cause (Figure 3c).
Second, neither does the spatial component of the wave function, which we have not
considered, play any essential role when it is separable from the spin component (as we
have presumed), nor does one need to consider the state independent properties of the
entangled quantum objects like mass and charge, since these do not change over the
measurement.
Finally, according to the quantum mechanical description, there neither is an inter-
mediate common cause u (as in Figure 3d) that screens off. The entangled quantum
state is the last state before collapse and the transition from the entangled state z to the
collapsed states x and y is temporally not extended: The entangled system described
by z exists up to the very point in time at which the separate objects described by
the product state start to exist. Especially, there is no instance in time at which an
intermediate state u might exist.
4.3 The product state after collapse is not a unit
The state immediately after collapse of the entangled state is a product state and reads
|x0〉 ⊗ |y0〉 or |x1〉 ⊗ |y1〉, respectively, where the sign ‘⊗’ denotes the tensor product.
(In short notation one often omits the sign, cf. e.g. (6)). While we have seen that
the entangled state is plausibly modelled as one variable, the product state lacks all
the peculiar features that make the entangled state so special. There are four essential
differences that speak for the case that one should model a product state by the two
distinct variables x and y that describe its components.
First, the product state assigns definite states to each component system (according
to both central interpretations of quantum states).8 The two states connected by the
tensor product (in a two-particle product state) are definite (one-particle) states, each
describing one of the objects that have been disentangled by the collapse. That the values
of the component variables are well-defined is a necessary requirement for regarding them
as variables of a causal model.
7 Spirtes et al. (2000, 35f) show that Salmon’s case of billiard balls is a too coarse grained description
of a common cause (Figure 3b) and that Davis’ description of a bulky TV switch (1988) omits an
intermediate common cause (Figure 3d).
8 Ray view or statistical operator view, respectively.
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Second, the component states of product states are synchronically separable. Describing
the state of the one object by |x0〉 or |x1〉, respectively, is a complete description of its
state (at a certain instant). There is no need to refer to the state of the other object.
There is no connection between the components of product states. Joining states by
the tensor product is quantum mechanics’ rule to form the joint state of two (or more)
separate systems. Any correlation between the components of such systems must be due
to their common causal history.
Third, the joint product state supervenes on the component states and it is therefore
the latter which should be regarded as fundamental. There is no further variable besides
the product state that describes the joint system. Consequently, describing the joint
system by one variable would describe a non-fundamental level and therefore not fit well
with the structure of the quantum mechanical description.
Fourth, the component states of product states are diachronically separable if the
objects do not interact: In this case one can separate the dynamical equations for
each component system (in quantum mechanics: Schrödinger equation) and treat them
independently. Without interactions, there is no connection between the component
states of product states.
In sum, the component states of quantum product states are as separate and distinct
as are states in classical physics (whose joint state is described by a Cartesian product
state). Quantum theory, which is our best theory of entangled systems including their
dynamics, describes the systems after collapse by two distinct variables, and there is no
evidence in its description for counting them as one joint variable. For these reasons, the
proposed model describes the state of each subsystem as values of distinct variables x or
y, respectively.
Against this direct, literal reading of the quantum mechanical description one might
object that there are features of the product state after collapse that speak for the case
that x and y in fact are not separate and distinct and therefore should be described
as one variable. Three options have some prima facie plausibility: (i) x and y denote
the same event by different descriptions (Figure 3h, unity by identity) or (ii) x and y
describe different parts of one event (Figure 3i, unity by composition) or (iii) x and
y are not independently fixable (for some other reason than identity; Figure 3j, unity
by dependent fixability). In each of these cases, if one wrongly considers x and y as
two different events, their cause appears to be an ICC. Note that, when talking about
entanglement in EPR experiments in the following, the states after collapse x and y are
also called ‘measurement outcomes’ or simply ‘outcomes’.
4.3.1 Against unity by identity
An example for the proposal that x and y denote the same event would be the case that
z1 describes the decay of a radium atom, x describes whether an α-particle is emitted,
and y whether a helium-nucleus is emitted. Clearly, x and y are identical and therefore
perfectly correlated; it is clear that in such situations the same formal scheme as in
Cartwright’s example holds, hence z1 appears to be an ICC.
The descriptions referring to the same event need not be analytically equivalent as in
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the given example; it suffices that they non-analytically refer to the same event (as for
Frege’s morning and evening star). As in any such case x and y, represented as distinct
variables, would violate the requirement that variables in a causal graph must describe
distinct states, I suggest to represent such situations by including both x and y in one
node and indicating the identity of their referent by an identity sign (figure 3h). Then
the correlation internal to the node is explained by the identity of the variables, and
there is no external correlation between distinct variables that could violate the CMC.
There is, however, no question that this proposal cannot be true in the case of
entanglement. For it would amount to saying that one electron turning out spin up is
the very same event as the other electron turning out spin down. A claim of identity in
this case would contradict the uncontroversial facts that, first, there are two electrons,
and, second, that the electrons (in the present example and generally) differ in their
properties.
4.3.2 Against unity by composition
The idea that x and y should be described as one event because they describe different
parts of an event that should be considered as a unit amounts to the claim that the
ICC is apparent due to a mereological misdescription. As an instructive example one
can consider the case of a radium atom emitting an α-particle, consisting of two protons
and two neutrons, with a certain probability lower than 1.9 If by z1 one describes the
decay event, by x, whether two protons are emitted, and by y, whether two neutrons are
emitted, we again get the same formal situation as in Cartwright’s example (1).
This model, however, misdescribes the situation, since the α-particle is one object,
so its emission should not be described by two different variables. Rather one should
represent x and y as one node in the graph (figure 3j), i.e. z is not a common cause
but a usual single cause. In this example ontological—more precisely: mereological—
considerations play a crucial role: It is the unity of the α-particle which requires to
summarize x and y as one variable and leads to accept the correlation between the
variables as not in need of causal explanation.
One might be tempted to advance a similar claim for entangled systems: Rather
than describing each component of the product state after collapse separately, e.g. one
electron having spin up and the other having spin down, one might think that these
states compose a joint state that must be described as a unit. Then, x and y should not
be considered as separate variables but as a composite variable xy. According to this
re-description there simply would be no correlation between distinct variables that needs
to be explained, hence the CMC could not be violated.
In contrast to the case of the α-particle, however, I deny that the description of
the product state after collapse as a causal unit is correct because there is no criterion
according to which a quantum mechanical product state should be regarded to be a unit.
9 This example is due to Hausman and Woodward (1999, 551) and is intended by the authors as
a misdescription by dependent fixability (see below), but one can also read it as a mereological
misdescription.
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First, it is clear that entanglement cannot help to lay the foundations of a unit in this
case since the emerging objects after collapse are not entangled any more.
Second, our examples of entangled systems show that the objects emerging after
collapse are not generally bound to each other (e.g. Cartwright’s molecule or an atom
emitting a photon).10 (In the case of the α-particle this criterion is fulfilled, since the
α-particle consists of two protons and two neutrons binding with each other.)
Third, the sub-states of the product state, which are candidates for the parts of
the composite state, can be arbitrarily spatially separated: In typical setups of EPR
experiments, the states after collapse describe objects that are non-locally related without
borders. (The components of the α-particle, in contrast, are close to each other.)
In sum, there is no evidence to describe the product state after collapse as a unity by
composition.
4.3.3 Against unity by dependent fixability
Woodward’s position
A third possibility of producing an apparent ICC has been discussed by Hausman and
Woodward (1999): x and y are not sufficiently distinct to be separate variables in causal
models, and should therefore be described as one variable. The criterion for distinctness
of variables Hausman and Woodward appeal to is today widely called ‘independent
fixability’ (IF; ‘independent disruptability’ in their paper from 1999) and is a central
and necessary requirement for (purely) causal models according to an interventionist
theory of causation: The set of variables in a causal model has to be chosen such that
‘it is possible to intervene on every variable [. . . ] and to set each such variable to each
of its values independently of the values to which other variables are set.’ (Woodward
2015, 312) If a set of variables contains a pair of variables that cannot be intervened on
independently, the set is not suited to serve as the basis for a (purely) causal model.11
Hausman and Woodward illustrate their idea with the already mentioned case of a
radium atom emitting an α-particle (cf. Section 4.3.2). They caution that one should
not choose one variable x to describe whether two protons are emitted, and another y
to describe whether two neutrons are emitted, because that would violate independent
fixability: One could not intervene on x without intervening at the same time on y (and
vice versa). In other words, one cannot break the causal mechanism from z to x without
breaking the one from z to y (and vice versa). Accordingly, they claim that the emission
should be described by one variable, i.e. x and y are represented as one node in the
graph (figure 3j), i.e. z is not a common cause but a usual single cause.
Now, for entangled systems Hausman and Woodward (1999, 564–7)12 advance a similar
10 For bonding as a criterion of composition see Husmann and Näger 2018.
11 Woodward (2015) acknowledges that there might be models violating IF because there are non-causal
dependences between the variables in question, such as logical relations, supervenience relations etc.
We shall discuss the question of possible connections between separate outcomes in Section 4.5. In
the present section we follow Hausman and Woodward’s idea that IF must be restored by regarding
the measurement outcomes as one variable.
12 On these pages, Hausman and Woodward defend in fact two different but similar views by similar
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claim: They maintain that the state after collapse, i.e. the product state, which consists
of the two measurement results x and y should in fact be described as one variable,
avoiding z to be an ICC, because independent fixability fails for x and y:
The notion of an intervention with respect to one of the measurement events is not
well-defined in the EPR phenomena, because the distinction between intervening
with respect to [x] and acting directly on both [x] and [y] cannot be drawn. The
reason given for this within the standard interpretation is that the correlated
particles are in a so-called non-separable or entangled state. In some way that is
difficult to understand, the two particles constitute a single composite object, even
though they may be at space-like separation from each other. The measurement
result on one wing [of an EPR/B experiment] is not really a distinct event from the
result on the other wing but rather both comprise ‘a single, indivisible non-local
event’ (Skyrms [1984], p. 255). (Hausman and Woodward 1999, 566)
The central idea here is that the measurement outcomes x and y should not be
considered as distinct causal variables since they are not independently fixable.13 This
would amount to saying that one may not consider one electron having spin up (x) as a
distinct event from the other having spin down (y), but needs to consider the two as one
joint event xy. According to this re-description there simply would be no correlation
between distinct variables that needs to be explained, hence the CMC could not be
violated.
Different readings
The truth of the claim that the measurement outcomes are not independently fixable
crucially depends on what exactly one means by ‘measurement outcomes’. I shall now
discern three different readings only one of which makes the claim true. Subsequently,
I shall explain why even in the reading according to which the assumption of distinct
variables would violate IF there are good reasons to regard the variables to be distinct.
Let us make clear the measurement process according to a discrete dynamical collapse
interpretation of quantum mechanics: We have a system of two particles, say two electrons,
in an entangled state, which above I have argued to be appropriately described by one
variable z. Each particle moves towards a measurement device14 and at the point in time
arguments. The view we discuss here seems to be Woodward’s (see Hausman and Woodward 1999, fn.
26 on p. 565); we shall examine Hausman’s view in Section 4.5.
13 This is how I read the passage. Hausman and Woodward’s explanation of the failure of IF, however, is
not unambiguous. Since the passage starts by referring to the measurement outcomes x and y, which
are clearly not entangled and hence separable, I take their note about non-separability to refer to the
entangled state prior to the measurement outcomes. While the alternative reading that one cannot
act on one particle without acting on the other as long as the two are entangled would be a true and
uncontroversial claim (I have already agreed above to describe the entangled state as one variable z),
that claim would not per se avoid an ICC (which Hausman and Woodward, however, intend), because
it does not say anything on how to model the collapsed state.
14 Each measurement device has a certain setting determining the measurement direction; for our
questions here, however, it suffices to assume the simplest case that the settings are constant in each
run, so that we can ignore them.
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t1, when the first particle, say the left one, hits the detector, the entangled state collapses
instantaneously to a product state, described by quantum mechanics as |x0〉|y0〉 or
|x1〉|y1〉. From this moment on the dynamical evolution of the two particles is decoupled:
the first particle further interacts with the matter of the detector (either it is scattered
or absorbed), however, since the particles are disentangled, without affecting the second
particle, which is still on its flight to the other detector. In the physical description
of such experiments one is not interested in the states of a particle after it has hit the
detector; rather what is important is that the interaction changes the physical state of
the detector such that the detector outputs a signal that is transferred to a humanly
readable display; say, the left measurement result is displayed starting from t2. When
the right particle hits the detector (say at t3 > t2), it interacts with the detector, which
starts a process that causes the right display of the measurement result starting at t4.
This somewhat detailed description will now help us to discern different readings of
Hausman’s and Woodward’s claim. Let us call the immediate states of the electrons
after collapse (at t1) x and y, the non-immediate states of the electrons after collapse x
′
and y′ (at some t > t1) and the displays of the measurement devices x
′′ (at t2) and y
′′
(at t4). Any of these pairs of variables might with some reason be called ‘measurement
outcomes’ and Hausman and Woodward do not say explicitly which of these events they
mean when they claim that the measurement outcomes are not independently fixable —
so let us assess their claim for all three possible meanings.15
First, in the debate about EPR experiments and entanglement ‘the measurement
outcomes’ usually denote the displays of the measurement devices x′′ and y′′. Understood
in this way, it would, however, be false to claim that the measurement outcomes are not
independently fixable: One can clearly fix the display of the measurement device x′′ by
some intervention, e.g. one can intervene on the position of the displaying pointer just as
one can intervene on a barometer dial (the latter is one of Hausman and Woodward’s
example of a valid intervention, see their 1999, p. 536).
Second, also the non-immediate states x′ or y′ of the electrons after collapse are
independently fixable. Since at the time of the non-immediate states the intimate connec-
tion due to entanglement has ceased to exist the process from x to x′ is independently
disruptable from the process from y to y′; and since the time interval between the
collapse and the non-immediate states is finite, there is no principled obstacle to perform
an intervention. Intervening on the spin of the one electron (y′), is possible and would
not change the spin of the other (x′). Consider, for instance, the state y′ of the electron
that is still on its way to the right detector: One can perform all sorts of local physical
manipulations on the state of this particle (e.g. reversing the spin by magnetic fields)
that will not affect the other particle (since the particles are disentangled since t1) and
that, if suitable, fix the value of the variable.
Third, concerning the immediate states x and y after collapse (at t1), however, the
claim that independent fixability fails is true. One cannot intervene on x (by disrupting
15 One reviewer hinted me to David Lewis’ letter to Brian Skyrms of 13 June 1983, in which Lewis
distinguishes two senses of ‘measurement result’: ‘the reduction of the wave function’ and ‘the triggering
of detectors’ (Lewis 2020, p. 108). This corresponds to my distinction between the immediate states
of the electrons after collapse and the displays of the measurement devices.
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the process to x) without disturbing y because the processes leading from z to x and from
z to y are both described by the collapse. There is no way to interrupt the collapse for one
variable but not for the other. (The reason for the failure of IF is emphatically not that
x and y are non-separable – forming a product state they are separable!) Consequently,
the best reading of Hausman’s and Woodward’s claim that the measurement outcomes
are not independently fixable is that it is the immediate states of the quantum objects
after collapse, described as two distinct variables, which are not independently fixable.
Discussion
In its best reading, Hausman and Woodward’s argument then is to say that the outcomes
immediately after collapse should be described as one variable, because they are not
independently fixable and independent fixability is a necessary criterion for variables
in causal models to be distinct. Upholding independent fixability also saves the CMC
because the problematic correlation between the outcomes is hidden in the joint variable.
This description is in accordance with usual principles of causal modelling.
Although it would be desirable to uphold all usual principles of causal modelling, I
think that there are at least three good reasons to describe the immediate outcomes after
collapse of the entangled state as two variables and to accept a violation of independent
fixability and modularity, and, hence, to acknowledge an anomaly for interventionist
theories of causation requiring the principles.
First, at the beginning of Section 4.3 I have argued that according to quantum
mechanics the states immediately after collapse are described by two separate variables.
So our best scientific theory of such systems makes a clear choice, and I think it is
reasonable to require that causal models should be in accordance with our best scientific
theories. One might object that quantum theory should not be taken too seriously when
it comes to judging matters of causation because it is not based on the principles of
causal modelling. That, however, seems a questionable assessment. Quantum theory
does provide information that is relevant for causal models: It is an essential part of
the quantum theoretical description (i) how to segment systems into distinct variables
and (ii) how these variables evolve dynamically over time, especially which variable
influences which — and this is exactly the information that is summarized in causal
models. Quantum mechanics provides well-tested and the best description of this kind
for entangled systems that we have.
Similarly, second, causal models should agree with our best ontological models. I have
argued above that there is no reasonable criterion of composition that would require to
regard the variables as one. According to all criteria the variables should be considered
to be distinct. Then, to assume the immediate states after collapse as one variable would
be in tension with our ontological assessments.
Third, describing the immediate states after collapse as one variable would have the
consequence that the deep and mysterious EPR/B correlations are not recognizable in
the model, since they are then hidden inside the joint variable. Since causal models
only require explanation of correlations between distinct variables, this assumption would
dispose the EPR correlations of the need to be explained. It is, however, difficult to
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believe, that the notorious EPR correlations should turn out as a mere artefact of
misdescription, a scheinproblem in the modern philosophy of physics. While one can
challenge that the EPR correlations can be explained causally (although I think they
can), causal models should definitely not hide them, but rather make them explicit. To
describe the case with two variables would just do that: make the anomaly explicit.
In sum, I think that the reasons for describing the immediate states after collapse as
two separate variables are quite strong such that the resulting violation of independent
fixability is well-founded.
The violation of IF appealed to here does not seem to be restricted to the quantum
realm. As an illustration, imagine the case of dividing a piece of twine in two halves with
scissors. Let z describe the position of the scissor relative to the undivided twine before
the cut and x and y denote the length of the left and right piece of twine, respectively,
immediately after division. Clearly, the processes towards x and y are not independently
disruptable: One cannot interrupt the process to the one without interrupting the process
to the other. This does not imply, however, that x and y are not separate variables.
Then, IF and modularity fail for the twine as for entangled systems.
As a result of the considerations about the quantum mechanical formalism so far, we
note that the quantum mechanical description of entangled states should be understood
to involve three distinct variables z, x and y. We now turn to the question which
connections hold between these distinct variables.
4.4 The entangled state is a common cause of the collapsed states
The proposed model involves a causal relation from z to x and from z to y, such that z
is a common cause of x and y.
It is natural to think that the entangled state is a cause of its collapsed state, and none
of the usual models denies this. To justify the claim, the causal relations in questions
can be inferred by interventions. Interventions on the entangled quantum state are in
most cases unproblematic since in typical EPR/B experiments the experimenter prepares,
and hence controls the quantum state. There is no evidence that the preparation
of the entangled state might not be an intervention. An experimenter can vary the
entangled stated at will (e.g. vary the value of q in (5)) and then observe that under such
interventions on z, z is correlated with x as well as with y. Hence, by usual standards
of causation z is common cause of x and of y.
4.5 There is no connection between the collapsed states
The proposed model assumes that there is no direct connection between the collapsed
states x and y. If this is true the CMC is violated, because even conditional on the
common cause z, x and y remain correlated to some degree – and this ‘excess correlation’
that is not screened off by z cannot be explained by the CMC.
It is clear that conservatives about causal modelling, who acknowledge that the
outcomes are separate variables (as we have argued above), have a high motivation to
assume a model according to which there is a connection of some kind between x and
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y that might explain the failure of screening off in a way consistent with the CMC.
The connection might be either causal in one direction (Figure 3e) or bidirectionally
causal (which would be a loop of two causal processes in opposite direction; Figure 3f),
or symmetrically non-causal (here depicted as a non-directed edge, Figure 3g).16,17
Most proponents of a connection between the outcomes have assumed the connection
to be non-causal because causation has been associated with a flow of conserved quantities
and the ability to send signals, but it is well-known that there is neither a flow of conserved
quantities from one wing of an EPR experiment to the other, nor can one send signals
(and furthermore both seems to be forbidden between space-like separated events by the
principles of relativity). The abstract approach to causation assumed by causal modelling,
however, is not committed to such characterizations of causation, and, in fact, a recent
analysis has revealed that quantum mechanics explains the failure to send signals by
a fine-tuning of the causal parameters (Näger 2016). So we here generally discuss the
evidences for a connection, whether causal or non-causal. What is important is that
in any case we need to look for a real physical connection; a mere correlation and any
epistemic relation that is implied by mere correlations like ‘knowing A entails B’ would
not suffice (correlations are the explanandum, not the explanans).
There is one noteworthy difference, though: While models with a causal relation would
save the CMC, models involving a non-causal relation would literally violate the principle.
However, Gebharter and Retzlaff (2020) explain that – in contrast to models without any
connection – the main idea of the causal Markov condition (and Bayes net modelling),
that correlations are to be explained by structure, can be saved in such scenarios when
one generalizes the CMC to structures including non-causal relations (‘global Markov
condition’, GMC). If the GMC is correct, it solves the additional challenge for a view that
assumes acausal connections, namely to provide a rule for how to derive probabilistic
consequences from a structure with the unusual element of a symmetric non-causal
relation (compare a similar problem for the proposal in Section 4.1).
4.5.1 Hausman’s view
Hausman and Woodward (1999) are among the proponents of a non-causal connection
between the outcomes. They present the position (which seems to be Hausman’s view)
as an alternative to their view that assumed the unity of x and y (which is Woodward’s
position; see our discussion in Section 4.3.3 and especially Fn. 12):
[The measurement results of EPR/B experiments] are distinct events, but they are
not probabilistically dependent on one another in virtue of being cause and effect
or effects of a common cause. Instead they bear a different kind of non-causal (but
non-accidental) relation to one another. (Hausman and Woodward 1999, 564f.)
16 It is even conceivable to assume an asymmetrical non-causal connection. Since, however, nobody
seems to have taken this view, we omit it here (however, what I say against the related models in the
following can easily be applied to this case as well).
17 Evans (2018), exploring retro-causal models of the situation, uses non-directed edges in another sense:
An edge connects each outcome and an earlier quantum state, indicating that the three variables are
‘different aspects of the same solution to a two-time boundary value problem’ (p. 765).
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Since they advance this claim in the context of a discussion of common cause models
x ← z → y, it seems fair to assume that they do not mean that there is no common
cause at all, but rather that the correlation between the measurement results are not
only in virtue of a direct causal relation or common cause, as the common cause will
surely contribute to the correlation to some extent. If this interpretation is correct, their
view might best be represented by a structure similar to Figure 3g.
In order to assess the position one would need more details about the kind of the
non-causal relation and evidence why to assume it. Since Hausman and Woodward,
however, do not provide these details, we move on to more explicit, elaborated versions
of this kind of model (leaving open that they could have meant one or the other of the
following models).
4.5.2 Making the models more explicit
The view that there is a non-causal, correlation producing, or at least correlation
explaining, relation between the measurement outcomes is rather widespread in the
debate about entanglement and Bell’s theorem. The strong correlation between the
outcomes that persists even given the complete quantum state at the source (‘outcome
dependence’) has been thought to establish some kind of non-causal connection between
the outcomes and has been given different names, most prominently ‘passion at-a-distance’
(introduced by Shimony 1984 and adopted by others, e.g. Redhead 1986; Jarrett 1989)
While the view emerged from the discussion about the more general Bell theorem, in the
following we shall examine what we can say from a causal modelling perspective on the
basis of the quantum mechanical formalism.
Since the connection is assumed to hold between ‘the measurement outcomes’, we
should recall the discussion from Section 4.3.3 that there are different possible under-
standings of the term, which might either mean the states of the particles immediately
after collapse, or the non-immediate states of the particles after collapse or the humanly
readable displays of the measurement apparatuses. Here as well, I think, it is obvious
that when the claim about the connection between the outcomes is to make any sense, it
should presume the first meaning. So the models we are considering here assume that
the states immediately after collapse are connected by a symmetric non-causal relation
of some kind.
How could one justify a connection? I emphasize that in the present context it
would be question begging to argue that there must be some kind of connection between
the outcomes because the CMC (or GMC) requires it in order to explain the strong
correlation. Since the question here is whether there are genuine ICC structures violating
the CMC, simply assuming that the CMC holds without giving further reasons, would be
to beg the question; rather, independent reasons for the existence of a connection would
be required, and here we examine whether the quantum mechanical formalism provides
evidence for a connection.18 In order to establish a connection we need a correlate in the
18 Since above we have already said that the effects of an ICC are usually not bound to each other, we
here have the more general question whether they are connected at all.
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formalism. There are four prima facie possible candidates: interactions, the relation of
non-separability, the collapse and conservation laws.
4.5.3 Interactions
It is well-known that usual interaction potentials (that appear in the Hamiltonian) cannot
connect the outcomes. Consider, for instance, that the experiment involves two electrons,
which due to their charge would clearly interact electromagnetically with each other.
But, first, this is not the general case, since one could have particles emerging from an
entangled state that do not interact at all, say two photons; and second, even if one has
an interaction, such interactions do not propagate faster than the speed of light.
4.5.4 Non-separability
One might think that the non-causal relation between the outcomes just is a holistic
relation of non-separability. However, while it is clear that the entangled state is non-
separable, the view that the measurement outcomes are non-separable is implausible: By
the quantum mechanical formalism, the measurement outcomes occur after collapse, i.e.
entanglement has ceased to exist and the post-collapse product state we are about to
describe is explicitly separable.
4.5.5 Collapse
Another, more serious candidate for a connection between the outcomes is the collapse of
the entangled state. Being instantaneous it can in principle connect space-like events.
Nevertheless, the collapse does not seem to be appropriately described as an influence
from the one outcome to the other for two main reasons.
First, the collapse is an instantaneous process which describes the transition from
the entangled state (5), the first stage of the process, to the product state (6), the final
stage of the process.19 It is in this sense, maybe somewhat imprecisely, that we have
said that the outcomes are the quantum states immediately after collapse. But if the
product state is the final stage of the process called ‘collapse’, then the collapse cannot
be a connection between the components of the product state, which are the outcomes.
Second, rather than describing a positive, physical connection between the objects,
the collapse describes the breaking of such a connection: The collapse describes the
transition from the entangled state, according to which the distant objects are connected
by a relation of non-separability, to the product state, according to which each object
has its own separate state. So the collapse for entangled systems describes the collapse
of the relation of non-separability, and its result is the absence of that formerly existing
connection, described by the separate outcomes. According to the quantum mechanical
19 The process from the entangled state to the product state being instantaneous means that the entangled
state exists at each instant in an open time interval [t0; t1[, and at t1 the product state starts to exist.
There is no finite temporal interval and hence no intermediate state between the first stage and the
last stage of the process.
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formalism, the outcomes x and y are just components of a separable product state and
there is no connection between the two.
Again the analogy with the case of dividing a piece of twine might help to push
intuitions here, the collapse being analogous to the cut: Before the cut the pieces making
up the twine are physically connected, and the cut leads to two unconnected pieces. It
would be absurd to say that the cut connects the pieces. The strong correlations between
the pieces after the cut (they always add up to the original length) cannot be explained
by a connection between them.
I conclude that the collapse is not a suitable correlate in the formalism for grounding
a connection between the outcomes. The collapse rather seems to be appropriately
understood as a process from a common cause to its effects (and the effects are not
connected, at least not by the collapse).
4.5.6 Conservation laws
It has some prima facie appeal to think that the connection between the outcomes might
be given by conservation laws, since the collapse of paradigmatic entangled states like
the singlet state
|ψ1〉 = (| ↑↓〉 − | ↓↑〉)/
√
2 (7)
seem to conserve the total spin direction SABz (the single spin directions sum to zero
before and after measurement).
Gebharter and Retzlaff (2020) have recently formulated a view of this kind in the
context of causal modelling. They argue that in cases of purported ICCs and especially
in EPR experiments the effects of the common cause are connected by a kind of non-
causal dependence that ‘arises due to background assumptions which rule how quantities,
properties, or parts are distributed among different objects or places if the common cause
occurs.’ (p. 1468f.) They hold that in the EPR case the relevant background assumptions
or ‘distribution conditions’ (p. 1479) as they also call them, are conservation laws.
Pairs of entangled photons can, for example, be produced by splitting a photon
beam with a non-linear crystal obeying energy and momentum conservation. So
there seem to be laws of nature (i.e., the principles of energy and momentum
conservation) ruling how quantities are distributed that are responsible for the fact
that [x] and [y] are dependent conditional on [the entangled state and the polarizer
settings]. Gebharter and Retzlaff (2020, p. 1480)
They then rule out causal relations (due to the space-like separation of the outcomes)
and conclude that the connection between the outcomes established by the conservation
laws is non-causal.
I would like to mention two worries that I have with this proposal. First, the proposal
seems to amount to the claim that the conservation law determines how the conserved
quantities in question are ‘distributed’ among the two outcomes, such that the outcomes
are correlated. We then have the following dilemma: Either, in a literal reading, the
conserved quantities are distributed, as the connection indicates, between the outcomes.
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Then, however, since the outcomes are space-like separated that would involve some kind
of superluminal propagation of conserved quantities, in tension with relativity. It does
not help for consistency with relativity to just say that the connection is non-causal when
a space-like flow of conserved quantities is involved. Alternatively, in a non-literal reading,
the conserved quantities are distributed in the preceding process from the non-local
entangled state to the outcomes. Then, however, it would be inappropriate to regard
the connection as holding between the outcomes, because the distribution has already
occurred when the outcomes emerge.
A second worry is this. On the one hand, it is true that conservation laws play a
central role in typical generation processes for entangled states. On the other hand, when
talking about the correlations of the measurement outcomes given the entangled state,
we are not concerned with the generation but with the measurement of entangled states,
i.e. the existence of an entangled state is presupposed and the measured correlations
between the outcomes need to be explained. There is, however, no conservation law for
measurements: the non-unitary collapse that occurs at measurement does not preserve
probability distributions. By collapsing all terms in the superposition but one, the
probability distribution generally changes. For this reason, typical conservation laws
in quantum physics refer to the unitary Hamilton dynamics that can, given certain
symmetries, preserve certain quantities. Note that relaxing the condition to preserve
the probability distribution does not help either: It is even true that there is no law
describing the conservation of the expectation values at spin measurement.
Let me shortly illustrate the claim. Given the singlet state, before the collapse, the
probability to measure ‘↑↓’ is 12 (and so is the probability for measuring ‘↓↑’). However,
once the collapse has occurred, the probability of measuring ‘↑↓’ is either 0 or 1 (and
similarly for the probability to measure ‘↓↑’). Furthermore, while the expectation value for
the relevant variable, the total spin direction SABz , does not change after the collapse for
the singlet state,20 it does change for other entangled states like |ψ2〉 = 1√2(| ↑↑〉+ | ↓↓〉).
21
So the conservation of the expectation value for the singlet state is not law-like; it is
an accidental fact since it seems to be due to the symmetry of the state, i.e. the initial
conditions, not due to the symmetry of the dynamics.
In sum, at the measurement of entangled states there are no relevant conservation
laws involved that a proponent of a connection between the outcomes could refer to.
4.5.7 Result
All prima facie plausible candidates for a connection between the outcomes in the quantum
mechanical formalism have turned out to be inappropriate for justifying a connection. I
conclude that there is no connection between the measurement outcomes.
One might wonder then, how the strong correlations between the outcomes can occur
when the outcomes are not connected. Does not Bell’s theorem show that there must
be a non-local connection? Of course there is a non-local connection, namely the non-
separability of the entangled state. However, there need not be an additional connection
20 〈SABz 〉t0 = 0 = 〈SABz 〉t1
21 〈SABz 〉t0 = 0 6= 〈SABz 〉t1 = ~
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between the outcomes, because the correlations observed between the outcomes are
already present in the entangled state. Have a look at (5): All possible combinations of
outcomes are already contained in the entangled state and all are perfectly correlated. The
collapse then just eliminates all possible combinations of outcomes but one, the emerging
product state, which then is strongly correlated. In order to secure the correlation, there
neither needs to be a conservation law working at collapse and the collapse does not need
to connect the outcomes.
Similarly with the twine: The pieces of twine emerging after the cut do not need to
be connected in order to be perfectly correlated (by adding up to the original length).
The connected pieces of twine before the cut just continue to exist after they have been
separated by the cut, and then it is not magic that afterwards they add up to the original
length. (In order to see the analogy to the entangled state more clearly, one might think
of the twine as having the disposition to be separable at infinitely many points, resulting
in correlated lengths of the pieces. And if one wants complete analogy in the sense that
the division of the twine also violates the CMC, one needs to think of the twine not
as being separated externally by scissors but by being in an unstable state such that it
divides indeterministically into two separate pieces of a certain length; i.e. before the
decay happens, it is undetermined how long the resulting pieces will be, although it is
certain that the two pieces will add up to the original length.)
5 Generalization to continuous collapse theories
In our analysis of the quantum mechanical formalism we have presumed a theory of




1− q of the
superposition terms in an entangled state (5) instantaneously change to 0 or 1, respectively,
when the state collapses. Continuous dynamical collapse theories, in contrast, require a
continuous and hence temporally extended dynamics for the weights of superpositions,
the most prominent being the theory of continuous spontaneous localization (CSL; Pearle
1989; Ghirardi et al. 1990). The theory assumes that the squared weights change by a
fair random walk, while their sum remains constant equal to 1 (so when one squared
weight decreases due to the random walk, the other accordingly increases). The collapse
process comes to an end when one of the squared weights reaches the value 1 (then, the
other squared weight has the value 0).22 Do such dynamical collapse theories involve
ICCs as well?
Say one of a pair of entangled particles hits a measurement device at t0, such that
the collapse process starts spontaneously shortly thereafter, the weights perform their
random walk, and the collapse finishes at t1, when one of the weights reaches the value 1.
Then, at all times before t1, and even when the collapse process has already started, we
still have an entangled state, so (by our reasoning in Section 4.1) we need to represent the
state before t1 as one variable. Only at t1 a product state emerges, which we represent
22 Pearle (2014) explains in detail that the situation of gambler’s ruin is a neat analogy for the random
walk of the quantum weights. Smirne and Bassi (2015, Fig. 1) illustrate the results of such random
walk simulations by graphs.
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by two separate variables (cf. Section 4.3). Hence, the crucial step, where a common





ε, where ε is infinitesimally small, to a state with weights 1
and 0, i.e. a product state.
Despite the fact that the last entangled state is only infinitesimally entangled, it is an
ICC – which can be seen as follows. The collapse process is a fair random walk, assigning
probability 1/2 to raise or lower each weight in each step of the process, so in particular
also for the last step. Consequently, the relevant probabilities for the last step of the
continuous process are:
P (x0y0|z0) = 1/2, P (x0|z0) = 1/2, P (y0|z0) = 1/2. (8)
Then, it is obvious that the common cause z0, the last entangled state, does not screen
off the two states x0 and y0 that form the product state, P (x0y0|z0) = 1/2 6= 1/4 =
P (x0|z0)P (y0|z0).
In sum, continuous collapse theories involve ICCs (in the instantaneous last step
of the continuous process) as discrete collapse theories do (where the whole process is
instantaneous).
6 Discussion of other interpretations
We have seen that genuine ICCs follow for the measurement of entangled systems when an
objective collapse theory is true, i.e. when (i) the wave function is interpreted realistically
and (ii) the indeterministic collapse at measurement represents the correct dynamics
(whether continuous or discrete). Since there are many interpretations of quantum theory
that are inconsistent with these assumptions, I here sketch roughly what a failure of one
of these conditions implies for the existence of genuine ICCs.
In the case that the indeterministic collapse is only an effective description (¬ii), and
the true dynamics is deterministic, there cannot be genuine ICCs because indeterminism,
as we have seen, is a necessary condition for ICCs. According to the de Broglie–Bohm
theory, for instance, the true dynamics is deterministic and consequently there are no
genuine ICCs. But since we can never know exactly the initial conditions (the particle
positions and the wave function) it appears as if there were an indeterministic collapse
on the level of the empirically available data, producing apparent ICCs on this level.
Similarly with Everett interpretations: The fundamental dynamics is deterministic,
so there cannot be genuine ICCs; however, for any observer who only has data from
a branch or world, there seems to be an indeterministic collapse and ICCs; but these,
again, are not genuine.
Finally, consider the case that the wave function is denied a realistic interpretation
in the sense that it does not describe features of physical systems (¬i). Quantum
Bayesianism (QBism; Caves et al. 2002), for instance, assumes that the wave function
describes subjective states of agents, that the probabilities from Born’s rule are subjective
probabilities and that measurements should be described by an indeterministic collapse,
representing a sudden change in the agent’s state of belief. Hence the collapse is not an
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ontic process, so condition (ii) fails as well. In this case, of course, there is no question
that the theory does not describe genuine ICCs in an ontological sense since the theory’s
scope is purely epistemic. Involving an indeterministic collapse, however, very similar
arguments to the ones I have presented above for realistic theories will lead to the
conclusion that there are irreducible ICCs in the causal description of these belief states,
violating the CMC. In this sense the theory implies ICCs on an epistemic level (and
similarly for related views such as Friederich 2011).
7 Conclusion
(1) In sum, the quantum mechanical description in a dynamic collapse interpretation
yields a causal model according to which the entangled state z is a proper common
cause of the distinct and unconnected collapsed states x and y. Since according to this
model z does not screen off the correlation between its effects, the quantum mechanical
formalism incorporates genuine ICCs, violating the CMC. If x and y denote the immediate
quantum states after collapse (rather than the detector states indicating the measurement
results), the model also violates modularity and IF. The arguments presented here provide
detailed evidence for Cartwright’s claim that there are genuine ICCs if a dynamic collapse
interpretation of quantum mechanics is true.
There were two main rival proposals to avoid an anomaly by redescribing the models
with quantum ICCs: One is to describe the product state immediately after collapse as
one variable xy; the other assumes a connection (of some kind) between the separate
variables x and y. Against Hausman and Woodward and others I have argued that
these suggestions to redescribe ICCs are implausible when one understands the quantum
mechanical formalism realistically.
(2) Rejecting the misdescription thesis argues against a natural reaction of many
philosophers of causation that reaches back until when the very first examples were raised
by Salmon and others. As long as ICCs could be redescribed to usual causal models,
they are no genuine threat to causal modelling or other usual claims about causation.
Only when the the misdescription thesis is well supported, as I have tried to argue here,
one has to take them and their unusual properties seriously.
It is worth stressing that the aim of this paper was just to reject the misdescription
thesis, and the resulting claim is that there are genuine ICCs; i.e. there is a causal
anomaly that has the structure of an ICC. Especially, the aim of the paper was not to
say how to deal with such genuine ICCs or how to explain the unusual correlations it
involves.
(3) I should mention that it is consistent with the results of this paper that one can
avoid the existence of ICCs, if one claims that quantum theory in a dynamic collapse
interpretation is not a realistic description of the micro processes in our world. One
might, for instance, assume that there are hidden variables u that characterize quantum
systems more precisely than the entangled quantum state z does, yielding one of the
structures in Figure 3b–c. The de Broglie–Bohm theory is the most prominent example




(4) Once the redescription of ICCs is implausible and their existence is substantiated,
further questions about ICCs (see Q2–Q6 above) come into focus, upon which I could not
touch in this paper. Most importantly, we have seen that systems with ICCs violate usual
principles of causal modelling: By definition the CMC does not hold in such systems,
and, as a matter of fact, modularity and independent fixability fail as well. While a
violation of the CMC directly violates causal Bayes nets modelling, a failure of IF and
modularity threatens interventionist theories of causation as defended by Woodward.
There are two main strategies to defend causal modelling against the challenge of ICCs:
Either one can assume that entangled quantum systems are not causal just because they
violate usual causal principles (van Fraassen 1982a; Spohn 2001). Or, if one considers
entangled quantum systems to require causal explanations, systems with ICCs are a
counterexample to the mentioned principles, which then need to be revised (Näger 2014;
a very similar proposal in Schurz 2017). Both options are live. Whether one chooses the
one or the other, it is clear that once the existence of ICCs is established by suitable
evidence, as I have argued here, it has substantive consequences.
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Näger,PaulM.(2021).Evidenceforinteractivecommoncauses.ResumingtheCartwright-Hausman-Woodwarddebate.Preprint.philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19531/
References 31/33
Cartwright, N. (2002). Against modularity, the causal Markov condition, and any link
between the two: Comments on Hausman and Woodward. The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 53 (3), 411–453.
Cartwright, N. (2006). From metaphysics to method: Comments on manipulability and
the causal Markov condition. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1),
197–218.
Caves, C. M., C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack (2002). Quantum probabilities as bayesian
probabilities. Physical Review A 65 (2), 022305.
Davis, W. (1988). Probabilistic theories of causation. In J. H. Fetzer (Ed.), Probability
and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Evans, P. W. (2018). Quantum causal models, faithfulness, and retrocausality. The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3), 745–774.
Friederich, S. (2011). How to spell out the epistemic conception of quantum states.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42 (3), 149 – 157.
Gebharter, A. and N. Retzlaff (2020). A new proposal how to handle counterexamples to
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